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WOMEN BE WARNED, EGG DONATION ISN'T ALL IT'S CRACKED
UP To BE: THE COPULATION OF SCIENCE AND THE COURTS
MAKES MULTIPLE MOMMIES

Heather A. Crews'
This Recent Development proposes that California's new
precedent for deciding maternity disputes arising pursuant to
gestational surrogacy arrangements weakens legal protections
afforded to the following populations: women who choose to
donate eggs without becoming mothers, women who serve as
gestational surrogates to friends or family members, and women
who accept egg donations without also accepting the donor as a
co-parent. The rule of law previously applied to surrogacy
disputes as articulatedin Johnson v. Calvertprotects the interests
of parties creating families through surrogacy while preserving
one of the few procreative methods available to lesbian couples.
The Johnson intent standardshould not be limited by the Supreme
Court of California'sholding in K.M v. E. G.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in Artificial Reproductive Technologies ("ART") are
revolutionizing the ways in which parents create families.' The
increasing use of in vitro fertilization, embryo and gamete freezing
and storage, gamete intra-fallopian transfer, and embryo
transplantation now make it possible for a child to have at least
Gestational surrogacy, in particular, is
five different parents
1J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008. Special

thanks to Virginia Christensen, Dr. Fulton T. Crews, Vijay Sivaraman, and Sara
K. Opdyke for their continued support, advice, and guidance.

2 MARY SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES:
WHAT MATTERS
MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION,
AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 1 (2001).
3 See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"?The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 355 (1991).
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rapidly gaining both popularity and societal acceptance as a
method of assisted reproduction.4 Gestational surrogacy involves
two types of ART:
in vitro fertilization and embryo
transplantation.' In a typical arrangement, a female donor's egg is
harvested and inseminated outside of her body.6 The fertilized egg
is then implanted in a second woman, who carries the child to term
and gives birth. The division of the reproductive functions in such
arrangements separates the female procreative role into two
distinct elements: genetic and gestational. 8 The woman who
contributes the egg is referred to as the "genetic mother" and the
woman who carries the pregnancy and gives birth is the
"gestational mother."9
In many gestational surrogacy
The potential parents might include the genetic parents (sperm and egg donors),
the gestational mother (woman who carries the pregnancy and gives birth), and
the functional parents (people who will raise the child). See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998) (describing a situation in which a child
had six potential parents).
4 Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: DeterminingLegal Maternity
in
GestationalSurrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 605, 606 (2003).
5 MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 35 (Harvard University
Press
1998). In vitro fertilization refers to the process by which a physician stimulates
a woman's ovaries to produce eggs, removes the eggs in a procedure called
laparoscopy, and fertilizes them with donor sperm in a Petri dish. Embryo
transplantation is the process by which the fertilized egg is implanted in the
uterus of a woman who will carry the child to term.
6See SHANLEY, supra note 2, at 103-04.
7
1 d.

8 See, e.g., Michelle Pierce-Gealy, "Are You My Mother? "': Ohio's Crazy-

Making Baby--Making Produces a New Definition of "Mother," 28 AKRON L.
REv. 535, 545 (1995).
9 See, e.g., id at 545. See also Adam P. Plant, With a Little Help from my
Friends: The Intersection of the Gestational Carrier Surrogacy Agreement,
Legislative Inaction, and Medical Advancement, 54 ALA. L. REV. 639, 664 n.6
(2003) (noting the inconsistency of nomenclature used in discussing gestational
surrogacy agreements).
The terms "surrogacy" and "surrogate" have been applied to a variety of
situations involving contracting parties producing a child through ART. See,
e.g., In re Baby M., 527 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (involving an arrangement in
which the surrogate gave birth to a child formed with her own egg that she
intended to relinquish at birth). Cf Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993) (involving a surrogate who agreed to be impregnated with an embryo
formed from another woman's fertilized egg). The term 'gestational surrogacy'

FALL 2005]

KM. v.E.G.

arrangements, one woman relinquishes her parental rights as part
of a contractual agreement with the woman who intends to parent
the child after birth.' However, if either of the two women have a
change of heart during or after the pregnancy, the courts must
determine which woman is the mother under law.
The courts' struggle to apply existing legal frameworks to the
complex familial arrangements made possible through ART has
been well documented."
In light of technological advances,
however, it is important to consider not only how the law adapts to
changes in technology, but also how the courts respond to new
trends in the groups who utilize these technologies. This Recent
Development focuses on a rapidly emerging legal trend in the use
of ART: disputes in which the parties to a gestational surrogacy
arrangement were formerly part of a committed lesbian
relationship.
Advances in egg harvesting and implantation
techniques (coupled with greater social acceptance of
nontraditional families) have led to a growing trend of lesbian
couples using this technique to create children. 2 Gestational
surrogacy arrangements appeal to lesbian couples because any
children born as a result will have a connection to both partners
through either genetics or gestation. Indeed, this technique may
provide the only method for same-sex couples to have a child with
a biological connection to both women. 3
K.M v. E.G. " is the first custody dispute between an egg donor

and a gestational mother who were part of a lesbian relationship to

as used in this Recent Development refers to the former situation, where the
surrogate is impregnated with an egg donated by another woman. But cf Emily
Doskow, The Second ParentTrap: Parentingfor Same-Sex Couples in a Brave
New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 2 (1999) (referring to this arrangement as "ovum
donation").
10 Larkey, supra note 4, at 610.
I Plant, supra note 9, at 664 n.19.
12 Doskow, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that surrogacy arrangements are
one of
the few methods available for same-sex couples to have a child). See generally
SHANLEY, supra note 2, at 124.
3Doskow, supra note 9, at 2.
"4 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005).
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reach the highest court of any state. 5 On August 22, 2005, the
Supreme Court of California held that both the genetic mother and
the gestational mother who agree to bring children into the world
through ART can be full legal parents. 6 In so doing, the court
diverged significantly from a standard formerly applied in
gestational surrogacy disputes between heterosexual couples and
gestational surrogates.17 This Recent Development proposes that
California's new precedent applied to gestational surrogacy
arrangements weakens legal protections afforded to the following
populations: women who choose to donate eggs without becoming
mothers, women who serve as gestational surrogates to friends or
family members, and women who accept egg donations without
also accepting the donor as a co-parent. The rule of law previously
applied to surrogacy disputes as articulated in Johnson v. Calvert8
protects the interests of parties creating families through surrogacy
while preserving one of the few procreative methods available to
lesbian couples. This rule should not be limited by the Supreme
Court of California's holding in KM v. E.G.
II. THE JOHNSON INTENT STANDARD: HARD BOILED

In Johnson v. Calvert, the Supreme Court of California
articulated a well-received standard for resolving parentage
disputes between genetic and gestational mothers arising pursuant
to a surrogacy agreement."' The Calverts, an infertile married
couple, contracted with a gestational surrogate (Johnson) to give
birth to a baby created by in vitro fertilization with the Calverts'
donated gametes (eggs and sperm).2" During the course of the
pregnancy Johnson decided to keep the unborn child, and both
15 Sanja Zgonjanin, What does it take to be a (Lesbian)Parent?On Intent and
Genetics, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 251-52 (2005).
16 K.M, 117 P.3d at 675.
17
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
18aid.
19Id.
20

Id. at 778. The term gametes refers to the components of human

reproductive material (eggs and sperm). In Johnson, Mrs. Calvert's egg was
fertilized with Mr. Calvert's sperm.
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Johnson and Mrs. Calvert petitioned the court for a declaration of
California's controlling statute, the Uniform
maternity.21
Parentage Act ("UPA"), recognizes both giving birth and genetic
consanguinity as grounds for maternity.22 As a result, both women
qualified as mothers under the UPA, and the court was forced to
create a new standard to address the issue of which mother (genetic
or gestational) had the superseding right to be declared the legal
parent.23
After discussing the complex biological, personal, legal and
social policy considerations surrounding surrogacy agreements, the
court held that the intent of the parties when entering into the
agreement was the best standard by which to determine competing
claims of maternity. 24 The Johnson court ruled that in a "tie
breaker" between a genetic and a gestational mother, the woman
who "intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own-is the natural mother under California law. '25 Although the
court recognized that Johnson's "gestative function" (i.e.
pregnancy) was necessary to bring about the child's birth, the court
did not concede that her later change of heart should eliminate the
original agreement between the parties. 26 By promulgating this
rule, the court protected the interests of the intended parents (in
this case, the genetic parents) because "but for their acted on
27
intention, the child would not exist.
The intent standard as articulated in Johnson is highly regarded
for several reasons.
This standard unambiguously allows
individuals and couples to enter into surrogate arrangements with
confidence that their agreement will be upheld and the child they
arranged to conceive will be given into their care.28 Furthermore,
21 Id. at 778.

Id. at 781 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1993)).
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
24Id. at 782-85.
22
23

25

Id. at 782.

26

Id.

27 Id.
28

Illana Hurwitz, CollaborativeReproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze

of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REv. 127, 143 (2000) (noting that the intent
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the standard is sufficiently flexible to apply to a variety of
surrogacy agreements and allows the court to award legal
parentage without giving priority to gestation or genetics." In
essence, courts may award maternity to whichever mother intended
to become a parent at the time of the agreement regardless of
whether the woman donated the egg or gave birth.
Finally, the Johnson standard provides a basis for courts to
decide surrogacy disputes without weakening existing statutory
protections for gamete donors who do not intend to parent. Many
states have enacted regulations providing that when a person
donates gametes to a physician for use in insemination, the genetic
donor has no parental claim to a resulting child.3" For example,
pursuant to California Family Code § 7613(b), the "donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived."'" Such statutes, enacted as a legislative response to the
growing number of families created through ART, recognize that
few people would donate genetic material if there was a possibility
that they could be responsible for children produced with it.32
Likewise, using donated gametes to conceive would be a risky
process for potential parents if the donor were able to assert
parental rights over the child. In Johnson, the court held that donor
protection statutes were inapplicable to individuals (like the
Calverts) who enter into a surrogacy arrangement with the intent to
become parents.33 In so doing, the court distinguished the intent to
donate genetic material from the intention to procreate a child
through a surrogate. As Justice Pannelli states in Johnson, the
standard "secures the commissioning couple's emotional and financial
investment in the procreative process, thereby making collaborative
reproduction a more attractive option for infertile couples").
29 Hill, supra note 3, at 414-15 (noting that application of the intent test
requires placing a "mental element" over biological ties to the child).
30
Genetics and Public Policy Center Legal Brief, http://www.
dnapolicy.org/downloads/pdfs/ARTLegalOverview.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
31 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (2005).
32

33

Genetics and Public Policy Center, supra note 30.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993).
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Calverts "never intended to 'donate' genetic material to anyone.
Rather, they intended to procreate a child genetically related to
them by the only available means."34
The intent standard is not without critics, however.35 Some
analysts point out that this standard ignores the best interests of the
child and does not take into account the ability of the intended
parties to care for the child. 6 The Johnson court addresses this
issue by noting that the intent analysis and the child's best interest
are not mutually exclusive, and that "the interests of the children,
particularly at the outset of their lives, are '[un]likely to run37
contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into being.'

Furthermore, under a best interest analysis, a surrogate could be
held to parental responsibilities contrary to her expectations if the
intending mother refused to accept responsibility for the child after
its birth.38 Other criticisms of the intent approach include the lack
of credence that the standard gives to the role of gestation involved
in conception. 39 However, this criticism highlights one of the
advantages of the standard. By focusing on the intent of the
parties, the court avoids having to make a judicial determination
giving greater weight to the gestational or genetic maternal role (an
argument better suited for philosophy than the courtroom). For
example, if parentage disputes were decided solely in favor of the
gestator, surrogacy arrangements would essentially be eliminated
as a procreative choice for women unable to give birth.
34 Id.

35 Larkey, supra note
36 Id. at 624.

4, at 623-24.

Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 297 (1990)).
37

38 The court in Johnson describes this kind of situation as "extremely rare."
Johnson, 851 P.2d 776 at 783. However, the California Court of Appeals faced a
similar dispute five years later in In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
280 (1998) (holding that the intending parents were responsible for the child).
39 See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 797-98 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (noting that
"[a] pregnant woman intending to bring a child into the world is more than a
mere container or breeding animal; she is a conscious agent of creation no less
than the genetic mother, and her humanity is implicated on a deep level. Her role
should not be devalued.").
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Despite criticism, the intent standard articulated in Johnson has
become a cornerstone by which many courts and legal scholars
analyze parentage disputes between gestational and genetic
mothers. 4' Even in states that do not expressly endorse the intent
test, many courts consider the original intent of the parties a major
factor in determining legal parentage in surrogacy disputes.41 For
the last twelve years, families built through surrogacy
arrangements in states upholding the intent standard have safely
made procreative choices based on the premise that any dispute
would be resolved in view of the parties' original intentions when
entering into the agreement.42
III.

K.M. v. E.G.

K.M. and E.G. entered into a committed lesbian relationship in
1993. 4' Long before this relationship, E.G. planned to become a
mother and had explored available options including artificial
insemination and adoption.44 K.M. knew of E.G.'s desire to
become a single parent and was "encouraging and supportive" of
See Larkey, supra note 4, at 622-23. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201
(2002) (providing that a child born to a surrogate mother is presumed to be the
child of the intended mother); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2001) (stating that "a
person identified as an intended parent in a [surrogacy] contract ... must be
treated in law as a natural parent under all circumstances"). But see Belsito v.
Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (1994) (rejecting the intent standard as articulated in
Johnson primarily due to the test's difficulty of proof and failure to emphasize
the gestator's role in the arrangement).
41 Ardis L. Campbell, Determination of Status as Legal or NaturalParents
in
Contested SurrogacyBirths, 77 A.L.R. 5th 567, § 3b (2000).
42 See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)
(considering a
lesbian couple who obtained a pre-birth judgment declaring them to be the "joint
intended legal parents" of the child presumably to bring themselves within the
Johnson standard and recognizing that preconception intent to be a parent is the
determinative inquiry in California). See also K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675
(Cal. 2005) (Kennard, J. dissenting) (noting that "since this court's decision in
Johnson... an unknown number of Californians have made procreative choices
in reliance on it.").
43 K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 482 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005).
4Id.
40
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her efforts.45 Although K.M. and E.G. were in a committed
relationship, they discussed and agreed that E.G.'s intention was to
have a child of her own.46 In 1994, E.G. learned that her repeated
attempts at artificial insemination were unsuccessful due to her
inability to produce sufficient eggs. 47 At the suggestion of a
fertility doctor, E.G. considered the possibility of using K.M.'s
eggs to become pregnant through a surrogacy arrangement. 48 E.G.
was hesitant because her relationship with K.M. was new, and she
feared a custody battle in the future with K.M. 49 However, after
the twelfth failed insemination, E.G. agreed to enter into a
surrogacy agreement, provided that K.M. would only serve as a
"real [egg] donor" and E.G. would be the only mother."
In order to enter into the surrogacy arrangement, K.M. signed a
waiver and consent form provided by the fertility clinic." The
contents of the form (entitled Consent Form for Ovum Donor
(Known)) included the following language:
I will agree to have eggs taken from my ovaries, in order that they may
be donated to another woman .... The recipient will have control over
the disposition of all retrieved eggs and resulting embryos ....

It is

understood that I waive any right and relinquish any claim to the
donated eggs or any pregnancy or offspring that might result from
them. I agree that the recipient may regard the donated eggs and any
offspring resulting therefrom as her own children ....
I specifically
disclaim and waive any rights in or [to] any child that may be
conceived as a result of the use of any ovum or egg of mine .....
I
waive the right of relationship or inheritance with respect to any child

born of this procedure.52

E.G. and K.M. reviewed the forms together and decided not to
reveal to other people that K.M. was the egg donor. 3 Although
45 id.
46 Id.
47 id.

48 K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 482 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.

2005).
49
50

id.

id.
51 1d. at
52 Id.

483.

" K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 483 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005).
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E.G. would be identified as the only parent, she agreed to consider
allowing K.M. to adopt the children if their relationship continued
for several years. 4 In 1995, E.G. gave birth to twin girls using the
donated genetic material of K.M and an anonymous sperm donor."
E.G. listed herself as the only parent on the birth certificates and
the children received E.G.'s surname.56
For the next five years, the twins lived together with E.G. and
K.M.57 E.G.'s relationship with K.M. began to deteriorate in 2001
and the couple subsequently separated. 8 At that time K.M.
petitioned the court seeking recognition as a legal parent.5 9 E.G.
argued that she never intended to share parental rights with K.M.
and sought a declaratory judgment that she was the only mother of
the twins.6"
A. The Lower CourtDecisions in K.M v. E.G.: Over Easy
At trial, the court granted E.G.'s motion to dismiss, finding that
K.M. was not a legal parent.6' The court examined the intent of the
parties and determined that K.M. and E.G. intended only E.G. to
be the legal mother.62 Although K.M. and E.G. were in a
committed relationship, K.M.'s intent to become an egg donor did
not qualify her for legal parent status. 63 The trial court applied the
donor protection statute explaining that K.M.'s "position was
analogous to that of a sperm donor, who is treated as a legal
stranger to the child if he donates sperm through a physician...

54

id.
" Id.at 484.
56 id.

57 id.
58 K.M.

v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 485 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.

2005).
59 Id.

60Id. at 486.
61 Id. at 485 (summarizing the holding of the lower court).
62 id.

63

K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 485 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.

2005) (summarizing the holding of the lower court).
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[there is] no reason to treat ovum donors as having greater claims
to parentage than sperm donors. '
The Appellate Court upheld the lower court's decision not to
recognize K.M. as a legal parent.6" In so ruling, the court
considered the parties' intention that E.G. would be the sole parent,
the egg donor consent form containing the waiver of the K.M.'s
parental rights, and the parties' relationship at the time of
conception.66 Although the court recognized that each of these
factors, taken alone, would not necessarily be a determination of
parentage, the cumulative effect was sufficient to suggest that E.G.
and K.M. intended for E.G. to be the only parent.67 The court
concluded that if the parties changed their original intentions and
wanted K.M. to be a parent, they had adoption as a means of
recourse."8 Quoting from Johnson, the court explained: "'Within
the context of artificial reproductive techniques ...

intentions that

are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought
presumptively to determine legal parenthood."' 69
Because K.M. donated her eggs without the original intent to
become a parent, her ability to gain parent status was precluded
unless E.G. consented to adoption. y K.M. appealed to the
Supreme Court of California.'
B. The Supreme Court of California's New Rule: Scrambled
On August 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of California
overturned the appellate court in a 4-2 opinion, holding that K.M.
qualified as a legal parent despite E.G.'s original intent to become
a single parent and K.M.'s waiver of all parental rights to the
children. 2 The majority applied a new rule, declaring that "a
64Id.at 485.
65 Id.at 477.
66 See generally id. at 489-500.
67 Id.
at 499.
K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 496 (2004) rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005).
68

69 id.
70 id.

7'K.M.
72 Id.

v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005).
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woman who has supplied her ova to impregnate her lesbian partner
in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint
home" is a mother of the resulting children.73 In order to reach this
rule, the court altered the intent test and declared the donor
protection statute inapplicable to situations in which children are
raised by lesbian partners in a joint home.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. K.M v. E.G. Weakens the Stability of Surrogacy Arrangements
Through application of the Johnson standard, the KM
appellate court examined the intentions of K.M. and E.G. at the
time of the surrogacy arrangement, finding that E.G. intended to be
the sole parent of the children.74 However, the Supreme Court of
California held that this finding was superseded by another
consideration: E.G. and K.M.'s intent to live together with the
children. The Supreme Court notes that "[t]he circumstances of
the present case are similar [to Johnson] in a crucial respect; both
the couple in Johnson and the couple in the present case intended
to produce a child that would be raised in their own home."'7' The

majority notes that establishing intent after time has passed is a
difficult task and determines that the only indisputable
manifestation of intent is the fact that the couple lived together
with the children. 76 This modified application of the intent test
presents a multitude of problems.
First, the court's reluctance to give credence to E.G.'s intent to
become a single parent undermines a fundamental premise of the
court system. Justice Moreno declined to focus on the couple's
original intent because it would require the court to base "the
determination of parentage upon a later judicial determination of
intent made years after the birth of the child." Although courts
" K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477, 482 (2004), rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005).
74

Id. at 489.

"

K.M., 117 P.3d at 679.

76 id.
77

Id.at

682.
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may struggle to determine intent in ambiguous situations, the
judiciary's primary function in such cases is to make an accurate
determination of factual issues such as intent through evidentiary
analysis.7" Under the KM holding, even if parties to a surrogacy
agreement establish their intentions through discussion, contract,
and subsequent actions, the legal rights of each party could be
successfully challenged years later.
Furthermore, despite Justice Moreno's reluctance to make a
parentage determination based on intent, the court's decision
ultimately rests on such a determination: the intent of the parties to
raise the children in a joint home.79 The Johnson court clearly
established that the intent inquiry focuses on the time of
conception: the legal mother is the woman who 'from the outset
intended to be the child's mother."8 The KM majority's focus on
the subsequent living arrangement of the parties is an
unprecedented jump from the established standard, one that could
not have been predicted and which undermines an unknown
number of surrogacy arrangements between co-habiting parties."
Although the percentage of surrogacy arrangements established
between parties that live together is undocumented, the
enforcement of their original agreements with respect to parentage
should not be precluded because of a living arrangement unrelated
to procreative actions.
B. The KM Decision Weakens StatutoryProtectionsfor Donors
As mentioned earlier, the Johnson court declined to apply the
California donor protection statute to individuals who donate
gametes with the intention of becoming parents.82 According to
Johnson, individuals in a surrogacy arrangement who intend to
Id. at 686 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (noting that "the task of determining
intent of persons who have undertaken assisted reproduction is not
fundamentally different than the task of determining intent in the context of
disputes involving contract, tort, or criminal law, something courts have done
satisfactorily
for centuries.").
79
Id.at 686 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
80 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (emphasis added).
81K.M., 117 P.3d 673 at 688-89.
8
2Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787.
78
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parent genetically related children are not donating their gametes
and cannot be denied parentage by statutes precluding the parental
rights of gamete donors.83 The K.M majority makes a similar
(although much more questionable) distinction between women
who "donate" eggs and women like K.M., who (according to the
Supreme Court) "provide... ova to her lesbian partner with whom
she [i]s living so that [the partner] can give birth."84 Essentially,
women who "donate" eggs are not entitled to declarations of
parentage, while "lesbian" women who "provide" ova can be legal
parents, even against the wishes of the gestational mother.
This distinction is arbitrary and weakens the protections given
to egg donors and recipients through legislation. The KM opinion
offers no standard by which to distinguish egg "donors" and
"providers," and the court's unwillingness to consider the
surrogacy agreement between the parties and K.M.'s donor consent
form as indicators of her status leaves no discernable guidance. In
addition, the majority's distinction expressly applies only to
"lesbian partner[s]" which creates a classification yet to be defined
by law.85 Finally, the court neglects to indicate how long partners
would have to live together to fall under this provision. Under the
KM rule, if a surrogacy dispute arises between cohabiting
lesbians, legal maternity will turn on whether or not the genetic
mother donated or provided the eggs to her partner, regardless of
how the parties intended or agreed to determine parentage.
The distinction between donors and providers allows not only
the opportunity for future donors to assert parental rights over
children created with their eggs, but also allows individuals who
conceive with donated eggs to impart maternal responsibilities to
the donor above and beyond those agreed on at the time of
conception. Based on the KM rule, if the genetic and gestational
mothers reside together for an unspecified period of time, the act of
co-habitation could serve as the basis for parentage liability of the
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8 K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 679 (Cal. 2005) (emphasis added).
85 Id.at 678.
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partner who did not intend to assume parental responsibilities. 6
By disregarding donor protection statutes precluding K.M.'s right
to be recognized as a legal parent to children created with her
donated eggs, the court's decision eliminates protections for both
donors and recipients of genetic material. Essentially, the majority
has rewritten the donor protection statute to state that a gamete
donor is the legal parent of a child born through ART whenever the
donor and birth mother "intended that the resulting child would be
raised in their joint home," even though both the donor and the
birth mother did not originally intend to be joint parents. 7
V. THE HARD BOILED CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the facts of the KM case, the Supreme
Court of California's desire to award parental rights to both women
is understandable. The fact that K.M. helped E.G. raise the twins
for the first five years of their lives and, for all intents and
purposes, served in a maternal role, undoubtedly influenced the
court's decision.88 By awarding maternity to both K.M. and E.G.
the court provided the twins with two parents as opposed to just
one, a goal supported by historical family law precedent.89
However, to obtain this result the court sacrificed the reliability of
surrogacy agreements and limited the application of statutory
protections for gamete donors.
When courts are faced with newly emerging trends in the use
of modem technologies, the need for stability in the law is critical.
For many courts, the Johnson intent standard serves as a clear and
established rule which can be applied to disputed claims of
motherhood when two women each have a legal claim.9" The
86 See id at 679 (noting the importance of the fact that the children were
"raised in their own home" but failing to delineate how long a couple would
have to live together with children to meet this standard).
87 Id. at 685 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
88
id.
89

See Linda Kelly, Family Planning,American Style, 52 ALA. L. REv. 943,

945 (noting that the concept of the traditional nuclear family is "breaking
down").
9

Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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intent test is sufficiently flexible to protect both gestators and
genetic mothers depending on how the parties initially intended to
structure their agreement. Preservation of the intent standard is
critical for maintaining gestational surrogacy as an option for
couples unable to conceive on their own. In light of the K.M.
majority's abrogation of Johnson and apparent willingness to
ignore preconception manifestations of intent, at least in some
cases, women who wish to donate eggs, serve as gestational
surrogates without becoming mothers, or accept egg donations
without accepting the donor as a co-parent should be forewarned:
surrogacy agreements may result in more than originally bargained
for.

